[VCEE Seminar] Continuing with the VCEE seminar online

[Mailing list of the VCEE seminar series]

Dear members and friends of the VCEE,

This is just to flag that next week Friday April 24, 2020 we will 
continue with the VCEE seminar online. For the two speakers see below or 
here: vcee.univie.ac.at/seminars-events/vcee-seminars/.

More information (link, etc.) will come to your mailbox at the beginning 
of next week. Please note that the seminar is scheduled for 10:00 - 
12:30 hrs with a small break in between.

Best regards,

Wieland Müller


Speaker: Linda Windsteiger (Max Planck Institute of Tax Law and Public 
Finance)

Title: Last Word Not Yet Spoken: Last Place and Rank Reversal Aversion

Abstract: Preferences over social ranks have emerged as potential 
drivers of weaker than expected support for redistributive interventions 
among those closest to the bottom of the income distribution. We compare 
preferences for alterations of the income distribution affecting the 
decision maker's social rank, but not their income, and compare them 
with similar alterations leaving both rank and income unchanged. We 
  find support for both a discontinuously greater disutility from 
occupying the last as opposed to higher ranks,thus affecting only those 
closest to the bottom of the distribution, and for a general dislike of 
rank reversals affecting most ranks. We moreover contribute to the 
replication literature by uncovering and correcting a potential reason 
for the failed replication of previous results. We discuss implications 
for policy design in both public  finance and management science.


Speaker: Lubomir Cingl (University of Economics Prague)

Title: Carrots or Sticks? Field Evidence on What Makes People Pay TV Fees

Authors: Jana Cahlíková, Lubomír Cingl, Kateřina Chadimová, Miroslav Zajíček

Abstract: In a large natural field experiment (N=82,645) we evaluate new 
strategies on how to increase compliance of potential TV fees evaders by 
sending them letters and randomly varying the text and envelope. We use 
two new text strategies aimed at(i) the elicitation of preference for 
fee designation, and (ii) the explanation of fee purpose. We also employ 
three well-known strategies that have so far given conflicting results 
in the literature: (iii) highlighting the formal consequences of 
evasion, (iv) stating the value of services obtained in exchange for the 
fee, and (v) invoking social norms. We also test two modifications of 
the envelope design and aim at recipients' reciprocity and attention 
stimulation by (vi) placing a picture of a fairy-tale cartoon character 
on the envelope and an identical sticker inside, or by (vii) placing 
there a red inscription ``Important'' instead. Our results show that the 
only treatment more efficient than the baseline is using the deterrence 
principle spelling out the formal consequences of not paying. Both 
envelope-modifying treatments marginally decrease the response and 
registration rates. In a preceding incentivized laboratory pre-test, 
students had predicted the ranking of the text treatments accurately.

-- 
Wieland Müller
Professor of Economics
University of Vienna & VCEE
Tilburg University, CentER & TILEC
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/wieland.mueller/
http://vcee.univie.ac.at/people/

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