[VCEE Seminar] VCEE Seminar 24.04.2020 online

[Mailing list of the VCEE seminar series]

Hi everyone,

You are invited to attend the VCEE seminar on Friday, April 24, from 10:00
to 12:30 hrs.
We have two speakers:  Lisa Windsteiger (Max Planck Institute of Tax Law
and Public Finance) and Lubomir Cingl (University of Economics, Prague).

As announced in a previous E-mail, we'll conduct this seminar online, more
precisely via Zoom.
Here is the link to the meeting:
https://zoom.us/j/98696370764?pwd=MWg1Q1RjMk9oaDZHbk9ZcnNmNnREQT09

You'll need to install Zoom in order to join the seminar.
If you don't have Zoom already, you can simply click right now on the link
above; you'll then be prompted to install it.
If you already have Zoom you can also use the following information:
Meeting ID: 986 9637 0764
Password: 8fwCce
If you need help, feel free to contact Philipp (
philipp.kuelpmann at univie.ac.at).

The move to an online seminar calls for a slight modification of our usual
schedule:
- 9:30: the waiting room opens
- 9:55: we let everyone into the seminar room
- 10:00--11:10: Lisa Windsteiger's talk
- 11:10--11:20: break
- 11:20--12:30: Lubomir Cingl's talk

Here is more information on the talks:

Lisa Windsteiger:
“Last Word Not Yet Spoken: Last Place and Rank Reversal Aversion”
*Abstract:*
Preferences over social ranks have emerged as potential drivers of weaker
than expected support for redistributive interventions among those closest
to the bottom of the income distribution. We compare preferences for
alterations of the income distribution affecting the decision maker's
social rank, but not their income, and compare them with similar
alterations leaving both rank and income unchanged. We  find support for
both a discontinuously greater disutility from occupying the last as
opposed to higher ranks, thus affecting only those closest to the bottom of
the distribution, and for a general dislike of rank reversals affecting
most ranks. We moreover contribute to the replication literature by
uncovering and correcting a potential reason for the failed replication of
previous results. We discuss implications for policy design in both public
 finance and management science.

Lubomir Cingl:
"Carrots or Sticks? Field Evidence on What Makes People Pay TV Fees"
with Jana Cahlíková, Kateřina Chadimová, and Miroslav Zajíček

*Abstract:*In a large natural field experiment (N=82,645) we evaluate new
strategies on how to increase compliance of potential TV fees evaders by
sending them letters and randomly varying the text and envelope. We use two
new text strategies aimed at (i) the elicitation of preference for fee
designation, and (ii) the explanation of fee purpose. We also employ three
well-known strategies that have so far given conflicting results in the
literature: (iii) highlighting the formal consequences of evasion, (iv)
stating the value of services obtained in exchange for the fee, and (v)
invoking social norms. We also test two modifications of the envelope
design and aim at recipients' reciprocity and attention stimulation by (vi)
placing a picture of a fairy-tale cartoon character on the envelope and an
identical sticker inside, or by (vii) placing there a red inscription
'Important' instead. Our results show that the only treatment more
efficient than the baseline is using the deterrence principle spelling out
the formal consequences of not paying. Both envelope-modifying treatments
marginally decrease the response and registration rates. In a preceding
incentivised laboratory pre-test, students had predicted the ranking of the
text treatments accurately.

Best,
Geoffrey
---
Lab Manager
Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE)
University of Vienna
https://vcee.univie.ac.at/
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