[VCEE Seminar] Reminder: VCEE seminar 19.06.2020 online
Mailing list of the VCEE seminar series
vcee-seminar at lists.univie.ac.at
Mon Jun 15 15:42:30 CEST 2020
You are invited to attend the VCEE seminar on Friday 19 June from 10:00 to
We have two speakers: Tomas Miklanek (University of Economics Prague) and
Radosveta Ivanova Stenzel (Technical University Berlin).
As previously we'll conduct this seminar via Zoom.
Here is the link to the meeting:
You'll need to install Zoom in order to join the seminar.
If you don't have Zoom already, you can simply click right now on the link
above; you'll then be prompted to install it.
If you already have Zoom you can also use the following information:
Meeting ID: 899 1236 6506
If you need help, feel free to contact Philipp (
philipp.kuelpmann at univie.ac.at).
The schedule is:
- 9:30: the waiting room opens
- 9:55: we let everyone into the seminar room
- 10:00--11:10: Tomas Miklanek's talk
- 11:10--11:20: break
- 11:20--12:30: Radosveta Ivanova Stenzel's talk
Here is more information on the talks:
"Do Fixed-Prize Lotteries Crowd Out Public Good Contributions Driven by
Fundraising for public goods by private contributions is often undermined
by free-riding. One prominent mechanism suggested to alleviate problem of
free-riding is a fixed-prize lottery with winning probabilities
proportional to individual contributions (Morgan, 2000; Morgan and Sefton,
2000). Yet, as extensively documented by economic experiments, subjects
often contribute even in the absence of incentives of this kind, suggesting
that their contributions are driven social preferences. This raises a
question of how the lottery incentive interacts with social preferences. We
present an experiment in which we de-couple the contribution effect of own
prize seeking from the potential crowding out effect due to the perception
that the others contribute because of their prize seeking, rather than to
benefit the group. Even though the lottery increases contributions relative
to the voluntary contribution case, we find that it also crowds out
voluntary contributions that are likely driven by social preferences.
Radosveta Ivanova Stenzel:
"How do sellers benefit from Buy-It-Now prices in eBay auctions?"
In eBay "Buy-It-Now'' (BIN) auctions, sellers make a take-it-or-leave-it
price (BIN-price) offer prior to the auction that buyers can either accept
or reject. In the case of acceptance, the transaction takes place at the
BIN-price. In the case of rejection, the final price is determined by the
auction. This article studies how eBay sellers set BIN-prices and whether
they benefit from using them. We apply a new experimental approach that
combines the advantages of lab and field experiments. We find that the eBay
format leads to prices substantially below those expected in second-price
auctions. Moreover, our results reveal that the publicly available
information on eBay about buyer experience and bidding behavior correlates
with the observed price deviation. When deciding on the BIN-price, sellers
respond to this information strategically. We also find that more
experienced sellers ask for higher BIN-prices, whereas seller risk aversion
does not affect their price decisions. Compared to an eBay auction without
a BIN-price, the BIN-auction is more efficient and generates significantly
Vienna Center for Experimental Economics (VCEE)
University of Vienna
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