[VCEE Seminar] REMINDER: VCEE Seminar with John R. Hamman - Invitation

[Mailing list of the VCEE seminar series]

Dear members and friends of the VCEE,

You are invited to attend the VCEE seminar on Friday June 16, 2023, from 10:30 to 12:00 hrs Vienna time.

The seminar takes place in lecture hall 16 (2nd floor) at Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1.

We will have one speaker: John R. Hamman (Florida State University), https://myweb.fsu.edu/jhamman/<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://myweb.fsu.edu/jhamman/&sa=D&source=calendar&usd=2&usg=AOvVaw1hjjmy29RU_zZNjqBEOdnl>

Here is more information about the talk:

Title:

Would I Lie to You? Project selection with biased advice (joint with Miguel Angel Martinez Carrasco and Eric Schmidbauer)<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id%3D3497665&sa=D&source=calendar&usd=2&usg=AOvVaw3pVqm7XGrzbR9PvvEiif7Y>



Abstract:
When agents with private information compete for resources from an uninformed decision-maker and are biased towards their own favored projects (e.g., a CEO decides which division manager's project to fund), they have incentive to strategically communicate about their project's value. However, possible future interaction can mitigate this problem even without reputational concerns, since an agent who induces acceptance of a low-valued project today consumes resources that crowd out better opportunities that may arrive in the future. We study this organizational environment both theoretically and empirically using laboratory experiments. We hypothesize and find that truth telling is easier to support as low-quality projects lose value or become more likely to occur, but harder to support as agent competition grows. We see an interesting behavioral result in which beliefs influence responsiveness to parameter changes. Specically, as agents grow more pessimistic about the likelihood of truthful reporting by their competitors, they respond more sharply to parameter changes, in line with the model's predictions.



If you are interested in meeting after the seminar (meeting slots of 30', room no 05.330) you can register via this link:

https://nuudel.digitalcourage.de/8EF9iDXkcAwElEwE

Best regards,

Nora Brandes

--
Mag. Nora Brandes
University of Vienna
Department of Economics
Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
1090-Wien, Austria
Phone: +43 1 4277 37404
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